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Abstract
Using Mexico’s Tarjeta de Visitante por Razones Humanitarias (TVRH) as a primary case 
study, this article examines how states can use temporary protection schemes as border 
security measures while claiming to provide protection. Although the TVRH offers a legal 
pathway and status to move within Mexico, it equally restricts certain rights due to its tem-
porary nature. It becomes a form of differential inclusion by which the state has the right to 
be able to “exclude and define the limits” of a particular population but also claim inclusion 
on humanitarian grounds. Despite the claim of protecting migrants, the application of this 
regular status can essentially become a form of interdiction, which sustains the political fram-
ing of migration as ultimately a “threat” that needs to be governed. On the ground, migrants 
with these temporary regular statuses occupy a liminal space and live a precarious existence 
similar to those migrants who do not possess a legal status at all. This power imbalance ex-
ists more often as states prefer to grant a temporary immigration status, which ensures less 
responsibility and support that accompanies more rights and protections. Based on policy 
analysis and field work, the article will examine the TVRH, the processes for obtaining this 
legal status, and the consequences for irregular migrants.
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Resumen
Usando de la Tarjeta de Visitante por Razones Humanitarias (TVRH) de México, como 
un estudio de caso prinicpal, este artículo examina cómo los estados pueden utilizar es-
quemas de protección temporal como medidas de seguridad mientras afirman brindar 
protección. Y aunque la TVRH ofrece una vía legal y estatus para moverse dentro de 
México, esto igualmente restringe ciertos derechos debido a su carácter temporal. De 
esta forma se convierte en una forma de inclusión diferencial mediante la cual el Estado 
tiene derecho a poder "excluir y definir los límites" de una población en particular, 
aunque también tenga la opción de reclamar inclusión por motivos humanitarios. A 
pesar de la pretensión de proteger a los migrantes, la aplicación de este estatus regular 
puede esencialmente convertirse en una forma de interdicción, que sostiene el encua-
dre político de la migración como una “amenaza” que, en última instancia, necesita ser 
controlada. Sobre el terreno, los migrantes con este regular estatus temporal pueden 
ocupar un espacio liminal y vivir una existencia precaria similar a los migrantes que no 
poseen ningún estatus legal. Este desequilibrio de poder existe con mayor frecuencia, 
ya que los estados prefieren otorgar un estatus migratorio temporal, lo que garantiza 
menos responsabilidad y compromiso con los derechos que acompañan la debida pro-
tección. Basado en la política, el análisis y el trabajo de campo, el artículo examina el 
TVRH, los procesos para la obtención de este estatus legal y las consecuencias para los 
migrantes irregulares.
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Introduction
Central American migrants from Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras have been 
increasingly fleeing their countries of origin in record numbers. The socio- political situ-
ation, which includes gang violence, political corruption, incessant poverty, and gender- 
based violence, combined with kidnappings and extortion, has been described as an 
“invisible refugee crisis” (Lakhani, 2016) when compared to other regions of the world. 
These conditions have forced displacement and migration to the north, whether it be to 
the United States (US) or Mexico. As this migration continued, however, and since the 
implementation of the Programa Frontera Sur (PFS, Southern Border Plan) in 2014, 
there was an increase in the number of humanitarian statuses issued by the Mexican 
government. The Tarjeta Visitante por Razones Humanitarias (TVRH) or the “visitor 
status for humanitarian reasons” is a regular status that may be obtained by a migrant 
who suffers or witnesses a crime while on Mexican territory. This article concentrates on 
Angulo- Pasel 3
the effects of the PFS and its connection to the TVRH, up to and including 2016. Its aim 
is to tell the story of migration enforcement with the Peña Nieto administration to high-
light how the TVRH became more used/solicited by migrants as a result of the imple-
mentation of the PFS, which (1) saw an increase in crimes being perpetrated by security 
forces against migrants transiting through Mexico, and (2) was a direct consequence of 
the “crisis” of unaccompanied minors during the Obama administration in the US. The 
year 2016 presents a fitting end point as this is when immigration policy in the US began 
to take a much more restrictive turn with the incoming Trump administration, which 
would also have policy implications for Mexico.
Accordingly, this article takes as its starting point the examination of this TVRH sta-
tus to explore the relationship between regular statuses and precarious migrants. Using 
policy analysis and fieldwork research, I argue that while the government claims that this 
status protects migrants by offering a type of regular status, its impacts on the ground 
create a power imbalance where the nation- state is able to not only govern an “undesir-
able” (Khosravi, 2011) and “disposable” (Wright, 2006) population, but also not neces-
sarily provide any meaningful relief for this population due to its temporary nature. This 
is despite the fact that the perpetrators of the crimes committed against migrants include 
the Mexican security forces who, in principle, are responsible for upholding national 
laws. Furthermore, while the nation- state may have more control over migrants’ mobil-
ity by keeping registration data on them; for instance, migrants, in contrast, occupy a 
liminal and insecure space and live in everyday precarity. This research involves an 
analysis of the TVRH by examining not only the formal processes and requirements 
requested by the state for migrants seeking this legal status, but also how these processes 
may hinder the everyday life of migrants and intensify their vulnerability.
In- depth interviews with both migrants and shelter staff provided further insight for 
the analysis and on- the- ground situated knowledge and experience. The field research 
took place in the fall of 2014 in the states of Oaxaca and Veracruz, and in Mexico City. 
Migrant shelters proved to be a productive site for this fieldwork research as they are 
important members of civil society involved with irregular migration from Central 
America. The first section of the article delves into the politics of temporary protection 
schemes and how the TVRH may be used as a technique of bordering in Mexico. The 
following section examines the TVRH in detail, outlining the processes and require-
ments for migrants seeking this status and the costs associated with obtaining it. The last 
section explores how this visa renders migrants precarious by placing them in positions 
of insecurity and instability.
Precarious Migrants and the State
Alongside border control and policing (Andreas, 2009), the criminalisation of migrants 
(Bacon, 2008; Inda, 2011), and “off- shore processing” zones (Mountz, 2015), temporary 
protection mechanisms have been used in the regulation of the movement of displaced 
people (Huysmans and Squire, 2009). Visas may be used as a form of surveillance and 
policing at a distance, whereby migrants register with the state and provide various 
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forms of personal information and living arrangements. A temporary status, therefore, 
may be conceptualised as a type of bordering practice (Rumford, 2011), by which the 
border is no longer fixed but rather manifests itself through processes and practices that 
occupy internal spaces. By issuing a temporary legal status, a nation- state may enact a 
policy with an exclusionary logic but use a humanitarian narrative to claim that it is 
supporting inclusion. In legal terms, for instance, the migrant may be “authorised” to be 
in the country, but the governing authority, the nation- state, may hold less responsibility 
over these migrants. As a result, the nation- state is able to assert its capacity to govern 
migrants and decide on “legitimate means of movement” (Torpey, 1998), while migrants 
simultaneously experience both inclusion and exclusion and easily become “deportable 
non- citizens” (De Genova, 2013). This type of “provisional inclusion” (Thomaz, 2018), 
for example, may include having the right to remain in the country, but not be given the 
right to employment.
In other words, by granting a temporary regular status, the nation- state can produce 
practices of spatial differentiation (Brambilla, 2015). Migrants, in turn, experience this 
bordering inclusion/exclusion where the border intersects with other socio- economic 
inequalities (Flores, 2019). In this particular case, migrants who are able to obtain the 
TVRH may have a “legal” and “regular” status in Mexico, but they also experience dif-
ferential inclusion where inclusion also involves various degrees of insecurity, instabil-
ity, discrimination, and exploitation (De Genova et al., 2015: 79). This status, therefore, 
has the effect of reproducing precarity whereby the lack of stability and security intersect 
with the lack of access to housing and employment, for example, which then places 
restrictions on everyday life, placing migrants in abject and perilous conditions overall 
(Baban et al., 2017). Migrants are in a liminal position and forced to manage and nego-
tiate access to various things. Furthermore, temporary “humanitarian” schemes may also 
reproduce vulnerability and precarity in the guise of protection by constituting the 
migrant as a victim rather than as an agent with rights. The official discourses surround-
ing forced migration, which typically focus on the exclusion of the “other,” are in tension 
with discourses that speak of human rights (O’Neill, 2008).
In Mexico, the government may use humanitarian grounds to grant this status and 
state that it seeks to “protect and safeguard” migrants; however, it is the border policies 
enforced by the nation- state that, in effect, render migrants insecure. Essentially, Central 
American migrants in Mexico began to apply for the TVRH more frequently after the 
summer of 2014 because it was at this time that the Peña Nieto administration imple-
mented the PFS or the Southern Border Plan. This border enforcement policy imple-
mented measures along the Mexico–Guatemala border and Mexico’s interior that sought 
to “protect and safeguard the human rights of migrants entering and transiting through 
Mexico and to regulate international crossings so as to increase the development and 
security of the region” (Presidencia de la Republica, 2014). However, to understand this 
policy requires that we examine the border politics behind its implementation and what 
occurred in the US during the same time period. Beginning in late spring 2014, an 
increasing number of unaccompanied minors began to arrive at the US–Mexico border. 
This event was covered extensively by the media and brought attention to border 
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security issues when it was reported that this humanitarian crisis was overwhelming 
officers and facilities of the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) as well as creating 
public outrage in many southern states (Meyer and Boggs, 2014). As a result, in June 
2014, the Obama administration applied political pressure to the Mexican government to 
“collaborate” and help reduce the number of irregular migrants, framing it as a “prob-
lem” of criminals luring children from Central America (Conlon, 2014).
So, while in theory, the PFS policy was meant to promote human rights and safe 
migration, in practice, its implementation intensified border enforcement operations (i.e. 
highway and railroad checkpoints, checks at hotels) along major migrant corridors with 
the help of migration authorities, as well as federal, state, and municipal security forces. 
Indeed, the implementation of the PFS “emphasised an approach to migration from the 
perspective of national security and control of migration flows,” including the “further 
militarization of the southern border by armed forces [and] the redeployment of over 300 
additional agents” (Inter- American Commission on Human Rights [IACHR], 2015: 
128). This border enforcement logic, especially with the collaboration of multiple gov-
ernance levels of security forces, served to further criminalise migrants by treating these 
operations as security processes rather than viewing migrants through a humanitarian 
lens (Angulo- Pasel, 2019). For example, this period saw a consistent rise in detentions 
and deportations without due process (Inter- American Commission on Human Rights 
[IACHR], 2015; WOLA, 2015), where according to the Observatorio de Legislación y 
Política Migratoria, (Castañeda, 2016) there were 93,613 detentions on the Southern 
border of Mexico between July 2014 and June 2015, compared to only 46,969 from July 
2013 to June 2014, which is close to a 100 per cent increase in one year.
Additionally, as we will further examine in the following section, these enforcement 
operations were also responsible for an increase in violence towards migrants by secu-
rity agents from various authorities (AICHR, 2015; Boggs, 2015; Meyer and Boggs, 
2014). According to an investigative report by the Washington Office on Latin America 
(WOLA), between 2014 (the year the PFS was enforced) and 2016, there was a 575 per 
cent increase in the number of migrants who regularised their status because they were 
victims or witnesses of crimes while in Mexico (Suárez et al., 2017). As this is the main 
reason needed to apply for a TVRH, the violence encountered by migrants with these 
enforcement operations, which were executed by security forces due to the PFS policy, 
highlights the connection to the rise in TVRH cases and applications. Consequently, the 
increase in cases and applications created an administration backlog within Mexico’s 
migration institutions and, as a result, migrants were rendered immobile having to wait 
in limbo for months for cases to be processed.
Therefore, alongside detentions and deportations, it may be argued that the TVRH 
was also used as a security measure by the Mexican government to help “stem the flow” 
of migrants to the US, effectively being a form of interdiction through immobilisation. 
These security measures were successful in helping with the “problem” in the US as, 
according to the CBP, the number of total apprehensions at the Southwest border began 
to drop significantly starting in July 2014 (40,708), then August (31,388), and then 
September (25,825; Secretary Johnson, 2016). Similar to the narrative of protection and 
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safety for migrants found in the PFS, the TVRH could also be used by the government 
to claim that it was responding to a humanitarian situation by providing migrants a legal 
and regular pathway while in Mexico. Globally, the Mexican government is able to 
achieve positive and favourable optics by addressing the Central American migrant cri-
sis and “collaborating” with the US. In reality, however, according to migrant activist, 
Julio Cesar Campos, there is no true support to help recipients of the TVRH because, 
“We call it la visa vete [the ‘go away’ visa], because it is clear the Mexican government 
doesn’t actually want to support these people” (Vonk, 2019). This double narrative was 
made clear by Rafael Moreno, the co- ordinator for a faith- based Jesuit network, who 
stated that Mexican immigration policy is similar to a “wolf in sheep’s clothing,” in that 
the Mexican government purports the “discourse of the sheep” by claiming it wants to 
protect human rights and migrants, which in turn allows it to “try and hide the very 
repressive [migration] policies that are happening here in Mexico” (Interview, 13 
November 2014, Mexico).
What Is the Tarjeta De Visitante Por Razones Humanitarias 
(TVRH)?
According to Article 52, section V(a) of Mexico’s Ley de Migración 2011 (Migration 
Law), the TVRH, or the “visitor status for humanitarian reasons,” is a temporary immi-
gration status that an individual can obtain if he/she has experienced a grave crime while 
on Mexican territory or if he/she has witnessed a crime. The regularisation process, 
however, consists of multiple stages and two main government institutions: the 
Procuraduría General de la República (PGR, Public Prosecutor’s Office) and the Instituto 
Nacional de Migración (INM, National Migration Institute). The PGR is responsible for 
receiving complaints and amassing evidence for these crimes. It is only when the PGR 
has determined that the migrant was indeed a victim of a grave crime, however, that the 
migrant is then able to apply to the INM for this regular status with a copy of the formal 
complaint filed at the PGR. According to immigration laws in Mexico, the rationale 
behind this type of status is to grant the migrant a temporary stay while his/her case is 
being investigated.
The TVRH is a distinct status and is different from a humanitarian visa in the sense 
that is generally understood. Many humanitarian visas, similar to seeking asylum or 
refugee status or the U Visa in the US, concentrate on the human rights violations that 
occurred while migrants are in their country of origin. The TVRH, however, is a tempo-
rary status whose requirements are not dependent on what occurred in their country of 
origin or the reasons for fleeing their country (i.e. persecution, violence), but rather a 
status they can obtain if they have suffered, and can prove, that a crime was committed 
in Mexico. So, this usually occurs while on their journey to the US. Migrants would not 
have necessarily applied for asylum or refugee status in Mexico because, for the major-
ity of them, their final destination was the US; they did not intend to stay in Mexico. 
According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the US continues to be 
the main country of destination for irregular migrants coming from Mesoamerica 
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(International Organization of Migration [IOM], n.d.). It is humanitarian, however, in 
that it is issued on humanitarian grounds because the victims’ rights have been violated 
and the goal is to achieve justice for those crimes. The humanitarian grounds are left to 
the discretion of the state of Mexico, which in this particular case, involves human rights 
violations as per the state’s national laws.
When the PFS was implemented in the summer of 2014, the number of TVRH appli-
cations began to climb because the violence increased. When the violence increased, 
migrants began to apply for this status in order to achieve safe passage through Mexico 
to the US. Consequently, if obtained, they could use this status more like a transit visa to 
provide a safe pathway and avoid vulnerable situations while in Mexico. As mentioned 
above, the PFS increased enforcement operations throughout Mexico’s interior. This 
resulted in migrants having to venture into more secluded areas to avoid checkpoints, 
walking for days or weeks in hidden areas that were targeted by criminal gangs and drug 
cartels (Knippen et al., 2015).
Another major outcome of the policy was the various forms of abuse and human 
rights violations by Mexican security forces (AICHR, 2015; Boggs, 2015). This is 
important for this analysis because there were migrants obtaining this status due to the 
crimes committed by the very state authorities who are meant to uphold laws. Thus, 
migrants, who are often victimised in their home countries are also re- victimised by state 
security forces while en route to the US, which highlights the police corruption present 
in Mexico. For example, reports claim that government migration enforcement opera-
tions escalated in mid 2014 where “physical and psychological aggressions occur[ed]; in 
addition, migrants [were] stripped of their money and belongings” (Knippen et al., 2015: 
10). Furthermore, according to the Red de Documentacion de las Organizaciones 
Defensoras de Migrantes (REDODEM) (2015: 64), there was an increase of approxi-
mately 180 per cent of crimes committed by authorities reported by migrants from 2014 
(467 crimes) to 2015 (868 crimes), and this number only takes into account those 
migrants who stayed in shelters and provided their testimony. This suggests that the 
number of crimes may be much higher.
The role of security forces is interesting to note because typically it is only the INM 
who has jurisdiction over migration matters in Mexico. Other security forces may assist 
the INM but may not carry out control and enforcement functions on their own (Knippen 
et al., 2015). However, once the PFS was implemented, this appeared to change. The 
involvement of different security forces became more frequent since mid 2014. For 
instance, prior to July 2014, the average number of “operations in which another author-
ity participated alongside the INM was 125.8 per month. From July 2014 to April 2015, 
this number climbed to an average of 429 per month” (Knippen et al., 2015: 10). In 
addition, migration enforcement is further complicated by the multiple levels of security 
forces that “assist” in these operations. The over- securitisation of the Mexican security 
apparatus (Arteaga, 2017) has meant that there are several security authorities at multi-
ple levels of governance that may take part in these operations despite jurisdiction, 
including the Federal Police (Policía Federal), the Army, the State Police (Policía 
Estatal), and the Municipal Police (Policía Municipal). According to migrant 
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testimonies, Red de Documentacion de las Organizaciones Defensoras de Migrantes 
(REDODEM) (2015) shows that the Federal Police was the main security force agency 
committing crimes against migrants followed by the Municipal Police, (Figure 1). The 
two principal crimes committed were robbery and extortion.
All of these events together culminated in many crimes that were committed against 
migrants; the number of migrants who were assaulted, robbed, and/or extorted surged 
and so did the number of cases/applications for the TVRH. As can be seen in Table 1, the 
number of TVRH granted has increased yearly where in 2016, the Mexican government 
granted 5,996 TVRHs, a number that is more than twenty times higher than the 201 
TVRHs that were granted in 2013 (SEGOB- INM, 2016). Two inter- related factors are 
notable here. One is the increase in TVRH applications, which can reflect the increase in 
violence and abuse but connected to this is also the increase in applications by migrants 
to try and combat the abuse by having a regular status to achieve safe passage.
Nevertheless, although this status allows migrants to remain in Mexico, the process 
to obtain it can be quite arduous, costly, and, once obtained, is temporary in nature, only 
being issued for one year. Furthermore, although government authorities typically place 
the waiting period for obtaining a TVRH at approximately three months, the abuses that 
Figure 1. Percentage of crimes committed by security forces: 2014, 2015.
Table 1. Tarjeta De Visitante Por Razones Humanitarias (TVRH) Issued by Year.
2013 2014 2015 2016
TVRH issued 201 336 374 5,996
Source. SEGOB- INM (2014, 2015, 2016); compiled by author.
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occurred with the implementation of the PFS, and the increased number of cases/appli-
cations, resulted in a system backlog where migrants could be waiting for over five 
months for a decision on their case file.
By analysing this migrant status and the process of regularisation, we can examine 
how the TVRH does not necessarily benefit already vulnerable individuals. First, there 
are costs associated with this regularisation process, which need to be considered. 
Second, not only are there costs to consider for the migrant, but also costs incurred by 
migrant shelters, which are key advocates in promoting migrant rights. Third, there are 
the challenges with respect to official documentation, access to consular services, and 
waiting.
Costs to Migrants
The TVRH can be obtained without a fee. According to the Ley de Migration, 2011 
(Migration Law), those individuals who apply for a regular status for humanitarian rea-
sons do not pay an application fee. However, while the actual process is free of charge, 
there are two factors that are incredibly costly for migrants and do not factor into the 
analysis. First, it is important to note that migrants who are fleeing their country of origin 
and use cargo trains to transit through Mexico are typically poor and therefore lack ade-
quate economic resources. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, to apply for this regular 
status, migrants first have to file a formal complaint at the PGR office. This process 
involves providing testimony for their cases, generally multiple times, before their cases 
are determined viable. As a result, they have to cover the transportation costs to and from 
these administrative offices. The offices may be close to where the migrant is staying or 
far away. Thus, the questions of access and mobility costs become important factors to 
consider and may result in restrictions for migrants.
For instance, while in a migrant shelter in Oaxaca, Alma1 explained to me how 
obtaining this status was difficult in practice. She had already gone to the PGR office 
twice since she had been staying at the migrant shelter. The PGR office was in Salina 
Cruz, a two- hour bus ride for her and her husband. First, she had to make the trip to 
Salina Cruz to start the process with the appropriate paperwork, and then continue to 
travel there to provide her and her husband’s testimony of events to determine if their 
case was “credible” according to officials. She claimed that it was both emotionally 
draining and economically stressful because they did not have the money to travel back 
and forth to provide their testimonies: “The testimony is done in stages and, every two 
weeks, we have to go to Salina Cruz. The bus costs $150 pesos per person, so me and my 
husband have to come up with $300 pesos and neither of us can work” (Interview, 24 
October 2014, Mexico). Furthermore, having to re- live her experience during her jour-
ney bears an emotional cost, as she was nearly raped by a group of five men while trying 
to reach the migrant shelter. She told me she already had nightmares daily, but the 
authorities at the PGR asked her to tell her traumatic story over again, while her husband 
was in another room doing the same thing: “They are trying to catch us in a lie as if this 
horrible thing didn’t happen to us and I have to re- live it every two weeks.” Similar to 
border regimes globally, this process is also “predicated upon suspicion” where the 
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migrant, who has already endured trauma, is also degraded by these experiences that 
further stigmatise them “with allegations of undeservingness” (De Genova, 2013: 
1180–1181).
Lastly, this process is also monetarily prohibitive because migrants are not able to 
work and thus do not necessarily have money for living expenses. To that end, there are 
migrants that end up living in migrant shelters for extended periods of time despite the 
fact that these shelters, by definition, are temporary and intended to cater to migrants 
while in transit. Yet, migrants have nowhere else to stay and therefore begin to live in 
migrant shelters on a longer- term basis. They are unable to work during this regularisa-
tion process and cannot work after receiving the regular status as it is not accompanied 
by a work permit. By virtue of not allowing migrants to work during or after this regu-
larisation process, the Mexican government is ostensibly (re)producing a precarious, 
unstable, vulnerable, and economically insecure existence for migrants who acquire a 
TVRH.
Costs to Shelters
Likewise, this potential change in living arrangements for migrants along with the 
longer- than- usual wait times for case processing has ramifications for migrant shelters 
that may become overcrowded and rely principally on donations to sustain their opera-
tions. There are multiple capacity issues, from the number of beds available, to food 
resources, food preparation, cleaning, and clothing necessities that are affected by pro-
longed stays. As important civil society actors with respect to migrant rights, shelters are 
at the frontlines of humanitarian relief by providing migrants with medical attention, 
food, a space to sleep, and legal knowledge. However, they operate mainly by acquiring 
donations, whether monetary or material (i.e. clothing, food at markets, etc.) and, there-
fore, do not necessarily have the resources to sustain a population for an indefinite 
amount of time. At times, shelters also have to provide economic assistance to migrants 
who require money for the transportation to and from the PGR offices. While speaking 
to Patricia, an administrator at a migrant shelter in Ixtepec, she expressed the economic 
difficulties shelters encounter when migrants are working through the TVRH process. 
She explained that if migrants do not have anyone from home sending them money, the 
shelter will offer to pay for their bus tickets to Salina Cruz: “There are people here that 
don’t have anyone back home. So, what do you do with these people? You have to sup-
port them economically so they can go and finish the process” (Interview, 27 October 
2014, Mexico). Therefore, not only do shelters accommodate migrants in- house, but 
they also may need to give monetary support for transportation costs.
Official Documentation
Another requirement from the Mexican government that may prevent access to acquir-
ing a TVRH for migrants is a “legible copy of a passport or a document of identification” 
(Cámara de Diputados del H. Congreso de la Unión, 2011). Nonetheless, the violence 
perpetrated against irregular migrants from Central America may leave those who 
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survive attacks, kidnappings, and robberies without any personal belongings, including 
forms of identification (AICHR, 2015; Human Rights Watch, 2016). Whether it is due to 
a robbery and/or attack along the migrant corridor or the lack of money to acquire offi-
cial documentation, migrants have difficulty producing official documentation to prove 
their identities (Bohmer and Shuman, 2007). During my visit, I met Sonia at a migrant 
shelter. She was woman from Honduras who had experienced this form of violence. 
Originally, she was travelling with her male cousin as he had previously accomplished 
the journey to the US successfully. During the first leg of her journey, she and her cousin 
were walking through deeply wooded areas in Southern Mexico. They were approached 
by a Municipal Police car that apprehended them and took them further out of site. The 
police officers then preceded to take them out of the vehicle and ask for all of their 
belongings. They robbed them and then let them go. She no longer had any mode of 
communication as they took her cell phone and did not have her ID, since they also took 
her wallet.
In these common situations, acquiring this regular status becomes much more cum-
bersome for the applicant because he/she no longer has the required documentation to 
proceed. Under normal circumstances, an individual would try to obtain a new form of 
identification through the consulate of their respective country. Nevertheless, for irregu-
lar migrants in Mexico, consular support can be quite arbitrary and also depends on how 
far the consulate is from citizens who require assistance. According to a WOLA report 
(Suárez et al., 2017: 18), consular aid can depend on which Central American country 
the migrant is from (i.e. some country consulates personnel are more apt to provide sup-
port for crime victims than others), and/or whether there is a consulate available (i.e. 
Sonora does not have Central American consulates). These situations may further delay 
the process, while migrants are forced to wait in uncertainty.
Waiting
On the ground, the results of the system backlog were evident. During the fall of 2014, 
when the implementation of PFS measures were most prevalent, the migrant shelter in 
Ixtepec where I conducted field research only received a handful of new migrants during 
my visit. The train, which passes behind the migrant shelter, did not have any migrants 
riding it. During this time in late 2014, shelters, “which once received approximately one 
thousand migrants per month, now [saw] no more than an average of 100 migrants per 
week” (Knippen et al., 2015). Furthermore, approximately 80 per cent of the migrants 
staying at this shelter were in the process of waiting for a TVRH, and many had been 
waiting there for over three months. The lack of migrants atop the cargo trains was a 
principal outcome of the security crackdown witnessed with PFS. In particular, security 
officials set up raids, roadblocks, and checkpoints along both train routes and major 
highways. This event pushed migrants into further secluded areas that placed them at 
higher risk of human rights violations, and away from the network of migrant shelters, 
which are purposely established along these train routes.
During a visit to the library of the shelter, a room where migrants passed the time by 
reading books or checking social media, I had a conversation with Jorge. A migrant from 
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Honduras, Jorge explained that he left his country because, since the coup d’état in 
2009,2 the violence and poverty had been worsening: “Since the ‘golpe de estado’ [mil-
itary coup ousting President Zelaya], the price for a basic basket of food has gone up so 
much. There are also more gangs that have taken over many areas” (Interview, 24 
October 2014, Mexico). He was growing impatient, however, because he had already 
been waiting for the TVRH for five months. Periods of immobility while waiting enhance 
moments of desperation among migrants (Brigden and Mainwaring, 2016). It difficult 
for migrants because they live with the uncertainty of waiting. Jorge, like others among 
him, was worried that after investing all of this time growing restless at this migrant 
shelter, he may not even be granted a TVRH.
This uncertainty is accompanied by desperation due to protracted displacement, 
which can cause increased mental stress as migrants become more resigned (Auyero, 
2012; Brun, 2015). Patricia, the migrant shelter administrator, noted that they see this 
desperation mount as time passes and sometimes it leads to migrants abandoning the 
process altogether. She explained:
there are people here that get tired, abandon the whole [TVRH] process and leave. Others 
don’t even file a claim because they say they don’t plan on staying and don’t want to waste 
their time. But I feel like with migration, people get desperate being here waiting for three 
or more months. (Interview, 27 October 2014, Mexico).
Indeed, long delays combined with distrust of authority and/or fear of rejection may all 
play a role in discouraging migrants from applying for a regular status (Basok and Rojas 
Wiesner, 2018). In the similar context of asylum, for example, a Latin American Working 
Group (LAWG) report highlights comparable findings where shelter staff share that 
[government] migration processes seem to “apostarle al desgaste,” in other words “bet 
that people will get tired and give up” (Burgi- Palomino and Buckhout, 2017), which 
takes up less of the government’s time. The process is even more physically and emo-
tionally exhausting if migrants do not have a place to live.
How Does the TVRH Reproduce Precarious Migrants and 
Structural Vulnerability?
One of the principal reasons the TVRH (re)produces precarity among migrants is due to 
its temporary legal status as the Mexican government only issues the TVRH for a year. 
While it is true that migrants can choose to extend it, the process is troublesome. For 
example, in Oaxaca, migrants must return to the PGR office in charge of their case to 
“obtain proof that the investigation of their case it still open” (Suárez et al., 2017: 17). 
This undertaking again presents an access problem for migrants who are no longer near 
the locations where they originally filed the complaint and can result in the status expir-
ing. Thus, this limited and temporary status (re)produces the precarity experienced by 
migrants due to the lack of stability and security in their everyday lives. Precarious 
instability suggests that migrants have to negotiate access to social rights like 
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employment and/or adequate housing (Baban et al., 2017). As Menjívar (2006: 1001) 
explains, laws create this uncertain status (not being fully documented or undocumented) 
and legal ambiguity, which “highlights the central role the state still plays in shaping and 
regulating immigrants’ lives.” Connected to this temporary status is the inability to work 
as this is a visa “without authorisation to realise remunerated activities” (Cámara de 
Diputados del H. Congreso de la Unión, 2011). Consequently, for any migrant without a 
permanent status, there is always that perpetual possibility of removal where migrants 
live in a constant state of “deportability” (De Genova, 2002) and vulnerability, while 
nation- states have the opportunity to surveil and control. Hence, the impact of the TVRH 
appears to be immobilising migrants for a period of time without necessarily providing 
significant support, and then having them leave the country with or without achieving 
justice for their human rights cases. This becomes more troubling when we recall the 
purpose of the TVRH and the reasons this status is granted. The TVRH is a result of 
migrants being victims of a crime while in Mexico, and the perpetrators of these crimes 
include Mexico’s multiple security forces, who in principle are supposed to uphold 
national human rights laws. Yet, despite migrants being victims of these crimes by state 
and non- state actors alike, the Mexican government provides insufficient relief to these 
populations. Overall, this legal immigration status creates an excluded population, vul-
nerability, and precariousness, which affect migrants’ overall security.
The inability to work is perhaps the TVRH’s most severe consequence of this legal 
status because it is directly associated to precarious employment and other insecure liv-
ing conditions. Being excluded from the Mexican labour market creates everyday vul-
nerability for migrants who are forced into the informal labour market. Not only are they 
economically insecure, but they also continue to occupy a liminal space despite having 
a formal legal immigration status. Migrants are legal in one sense, but illegal in another, 
so they straggle this liminal space (Menjívar, 2006). In fact, with respect to economic 
insecurity, it is as if migrants do not have a legal status at all since, they are essentially 
in the same position within the labour market (without work authorisation) as they were 
prior to obtaining a TVRH. Similar to “undocumented” migrants, they have to work 
without a permit. It is these types of temporary legal statuses that underscore differential 
inclusion by continuing to marginalise and exploit certain groups of migrants while 
claiming to provide rights, such as the right to be legally in the country. The majority of 
migrants who obtain a TVRH still have to work in “grey areas of the economy,” mostly 
in agriculture (i.e. cutting sugar cane) or, in the case of women, domestic or service 
work. Likewise, since they are not supposed to work, employers can easily take advan-
tage of them.
The main risks associated with being forced to work in an informal labour market due 
to the inability to obtain a work permit centre on access to sustainable living wages and 
labour and/or human rights. Although migrants with a TVRH can legally stay in Mexico 
for one year, they must also make a living to survive. After 2014, the average minimum 
wage in Mexico was $65.53 peso (MXN) per day, which was equivalent to approxi-
mately US$5.05 (USD) (Mauer, 2014). Even if migrants could obtain this wage, it would 
make survival difficult. However, employers who hire migrants without work permits 
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– which in this case, would be the case for those migrants who have the TVRH and those 
who do not – typically pay lower wages. Furthermore, as noted by a UNWomen report, 
migrants without a legal status may not have labour contracts, may work longer hours 
than was verbally agreed to, and may not be paid for these extra hours, or not be paid at 
all (Hennebry et al., 2016). Norma, a migrant shelter administrator, further explains this 
precarious situation: “Within informality [informal work] the abuses are always the 
same, they [migrants] tell us ‘they promised to pay me 1000 pesos and it turns out that 
at the end of the week, they gave me 600 pesos, and when I go to claim it, they tell me 
that I don’t have papers’” (Interview, 20 November 2014, Mexico). The point is that both 
migrants with a TVRH and those without a “legal status” are generally treated similarly 
because both groups lack a work permit and can thus be exploited.
Related to the above point is the lack of access to labour rights. Mexico has detailed 
labour laws that migrants with the TVRH cannot access. Laws associated with minimum 
wage, health and safety, humane working hours, and protections against dismissal are 
among the basic securities in today’s workforce. But employers know that they can take 
advantage of migrants without work permits and exploit those rights by using the fear of 
reporting at any point if a migrant worker complains or demands rights. Furthermore, not 
only do these migrants lack access to labour rights, but they will also lack access to jus-
tice mechanisms if any rights are violated. They are unable to report crimes due to fear. 
In the end, without a steady, sustainable income, migrants are unable to survive and, as 
Vonk (2019) claims, “often settle in the poorest and most dangerous areas of town, where 
they are quickly singled out by gangs, cartels, and corrupt policemen. Eventually, many 
become fed up and set off toward the U.S. border once again.”
Moreover, while it may be argued that this precarious or insecure work is also expe-
rienced by Mexican nationals, especially in the informal sector, irregular migrants are 
affected by multiple intersections of marginalisation such as poverty, but also nationality 
and ethnicity, which leave them more vulnerable vis-à-vis their Mexican counterparts 
because they are more easily “othered.” First, not only can irregular migrants be termi-
nated by their employer, but they can also be deported back to their country of origin. 
Additionally, patterns of xenophobia began to form in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
when migrants deemed “undocumented” became associated with criminality with the 
General Law of the Population. This law criminalised undocumented migration, making 
it a felony to enter Mexico without legal documentation or to be found with an expired 
visa, examples of crimes that were punishable for up to ten years (Gonzalez- Murphy and 
Koslowski, 2011). Irregular migrants, therefore, have carried a xenophobic criminal 
stigma in Mexico, which sows mistrust among Mexican nationals and renders migrants 
more vulnerable to everyday exploitation and discrimination (Cruz Salazar, 2011). 
Despite the portrayal of Mexico as celebrating mestizage (mixed race heritage), there is 
also a history of xenophobia and discrimination against indigenous people, which is only 
rising (International Crisis Group, 2018: 14).
Lastly, migrant women who obtain a TVRH but cannot work are specifically margin-
alised and experience gender- based exploitation due to their sex. For example, similar to 
those without a “legal status,” they may be employed as domestic care workers, may be 
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required to live in the home and may feel pressure to enter into sexual relationships with 
male employers (Hennebry et al., 2016: 55). Women may also typically work in the ser-
vice sector as either bar tenders or waitstaff. However, the border zones in Chiapas are 
well- known areas where the lines between restaurants and/or bars and brothels become 
blurred. Women in these situations can experience sexual exploitation and be forced into 
sex work (Ruiz, 2009). This situation is also common in Mexico, Districto Federal 
(Mexico City) where according to shelter administrator, Norma, women who are physi-
cally attractive may think they can make more money with their appearance, “but, she 
doesn’t realise when she gets exposed to some kind of trafficking … until suddenly they 
are involved in it and it is too late.” Consequently, the most precarious type of informal 
work for women is “to be employed as a waitress because of the type of place it is, like 
a bar, [where] some [men] invite them to go out and, in the end, all they wanted was to 
be with them [sexually], and that is where the prostitution comes in” (Interview, 20 
November 2014). Overall, the TVRH creates a system of structural vulnerability, which 
generates precarious circumstances and enables employers to erode and violate labour 
standards as well as human rights.
Conclusion
In theory, temporary protection schemes that apply humanitarian grounds may appear to 
care for migrants. In a certain way, for instance, they protect migrants in Mexico from 
having to hide and conceal their presence, thus decreasing the likelihood of becoming 
the targets of pandillas (‘criminal gangs’) and/or drug trafficking criminal organisations. 
The staff at Las Patronas, a migrant shelter in Veracruz, noted it is not ideal like asylum, 
but it is “something” (Vonk, 2019). But is “better than nothing” what we should be striv-
ing for? This article has argued that in reality, the TVRH is a stopgap that lacks mean-
ingful rights for migrants, even though they are entitled to rights under international and 
national conventions. The Mexican government can use the TVRH to exercise its sover-
eignty and decision- making power on issues of inclusion and exclusion. In reality, how-
ever, the effects of the TVRH are continued exclusion, vulnerability, and precarity. 
Ironically, the TVRH also underscores the lack of relief available to migrants even 
though they have been victims of crimes committed while in Mexico, with many of the 
perpetrators being the security forces who are theoretically supposed to uphold these 
national laws vis-à-vis human rights. Migrants are often re- victimised with these crimes, 
and yet there is insufficient relief that is available to them.
Meanwhile, with the TVRH, migrants are rendered precarious subjects due to their 
temporary legal status. They occupy a liminal space where they are somewhat included 
in society while at the same time excluded from claiming rights, like the right to work, 
the right to decent housing, the right to access justice, and the right to a sustainable live-
lihood. In sum, this is a power imbalance where the state determines how (and whether) 
these people live and under what conditions while migrants are left to live a life of insta-
bility, marginalisation, fear, anxiety, and isolation. As Galtung (1990) argues, these mar-
ginalised bodies are exploited and left so disadvantaged that they either die or are left in 
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a permanent state of misery. Against this backdrop, it is unsurprising that migrants con-
sider moving on and continuing their journey to the US despite their regular immigration 
status.
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Notes
1. Unless otherwise noted, all names used in this article are pseudonyms to protect the identities 
of those interviewed/observed.
2. The Honduran coup d’état occurred on 28 June 2009, when the Honduran army, on the orders 
of the Honduran Supreme Court, forcibly removed President Manuel Zelaya from the presiden-
tial palace and exiled him to Costa Rica.
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